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INTRODUCTION

Legal realists have long believed that judges make an instinctive
decision about the just result in a case, and then invent law (manipulate the precedents) to justify their conclusions.1 In this article
I intend to show that not only is this what judges do in fact, but
moreover, this is exactly what judges should do. To do this it is
necessary to show that the true purpose of the law is to achieve
justice. To do this it is necessary to show how we can tell what
purposes of the law are. To do this it is necessary to explain how
legal realists use the scientific method. Part II of this article ad1. Karl Llewellyn tries to demonstrate this in Chapter IV of The Bramble Bush. See K.
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 56-70 (2d ed. 1951); cf. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 287-88

(1929) ("judicial intuitions, and the opinions lighted and warmed by the feeling which produced them ... not only give justice in the cause, but like a great white way, make plain in
the wilderness the way of the Lord for judicial feet to follow").

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol12/iss1/3

2

Kaufman: The Scientific Method in Legal Thought: Legal Realism and the Fou

PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE

1980]

dresses these problems and explains how to derive the principles of
justice which underlie all our rules of law. Part III then ranks these
principles in a rough descending order of importance in deciding
actual cases. Part IV explains the significance and proper usage of
principles of justice in the development of rules of law.
II.

USING

THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD

The most important premise of the scientific method is that a
theory's validity is tested by its congruence with reality.2 One of
the few things realists have always agreed on is "an insistence on
results as the single test of the validity of a proposition." In that
sense legal realism has always accepted the validity of the scientific
premise.
Realists accept as "reality" what courts and legislatures actually
do. Their recorded decisions are an external and independent collection of data not subject to the will of legal theorists.' As
Holmes, the father of legal realism, put it, "The prophecies of what
the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I
mean by the law." 5 In that sense any theory of law is valid only to
the extent it can predict what courts and legislatures will actually
do when faced with a particular conflict in society. The insistence
that rules explain cases before they could be accepted as rules of
"law" led to the realist technique of challenging traditional rules
with "case law undergrounds"-groups of cases outside the neat
boxes of traditional theory, but consistent in trying to reach a just
result.
Certainly this realist technique has had dramatic results in the
past. Grant Gilmore argues in The Death of Contracts that the
reason why Corbin on Contracts7 made such a small ripple upon

2. See F. BEUTEL, EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE SCIENSTATE 55 (1975).
3. H. REUSCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENCE-ITs AMERICAN PROPHETS 203 (2d ed. 1971); cf. id. at
230 (similar views of Yntema); id. at 193-94 (similar views of Bingham); id. at 183 (Pound's
"fidelity to the stern realities").
4. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
5. Id. at 460-61. For an explanation of why external data is necessary, see Kaufman,
The Nature of Justice: John Rawls and Pure Procedural Justice, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 197,
200-02, 223 (1980).
6. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 56 (1974).
7. See id. at 57 (describing Corbin on Contracts as "the greatest law book ever
written").
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publication was Corbin's prior success in demanding that the Restatement of Contracts take note of various "case law undergrounds" and include their rules.8 Gilmore called this the
"Corbinization" of contract law,9 and to Corbin and Cardozo he
attributed the destruction of classical contract theory. 10 But it is
time for us to go beyond the mere extraction of new generalizations, new "rules," from cases as they come down. We can carry
the process of abstraction one step further. Just as we abstract
"rules" of law from results of courts in particular cases," so also
we can abstract? "principles" of justice that explain why, those rules
have endured.
A. The Realist Assertion
Realists have long accused formalist judges of concealing the
true basis of their decisions by pretending the results they reached
were inevitable." Realists have always insisted on the existence of
judicial discretion to reach a result favoring either side in the typical case.'" In fact, realists typically claim that eliminating judicial
discretion is impossible,' and even if it were possible, it would be
a bad idea since discretion is needed to allow judges to achieve
justice.'" What the realist sees as necessary is giving the judge the
wisdom and understanding of his job which enables him to use his
discretion properly.'
8. See id. at 57-70.
9. Id. at 70-71.
10. Id. at 57.
11. Milsom, in his review of The Death of Contract, calls this insistence on drawing
rules "the compulsion to intellectualize." Milsom, Book Review, 84 YALE L.J. 1585, 1587
(1975). But I shall consider it a perfectly sensible and legitimate action by courts and writers, required by the ninth principle of justice-"Justice demands that like cases be treated
alike, i.e., that there be rules."
12. See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 142 (1930) ("the judicial genius must do
his work on the sly"). I use the word "accused" because there is often an element of intemperateness in these attacks; no doubt emotions ran high on both sides. 13. H. REUSCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENCE-ITs AMERICAN PROPHETS 194 (2d ed. 1971) (quoting Bingham: "No court is bound by precedent or by previous generalization").
14. See a recent discussion of this in Weder, Discretion: The Unacknowledged Side of
the Law, 25 TORONTO L.J. 120 (1975).
15. See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 139-42 (1930) (concluding that "the law
is at its best when the judges are wisely and consciously exercising their discretion, their
power to individualize cases").
16. For example, the present writer has commented on the proper theory of the "parol
evidence" rule (Rule against Contradicting Integrated Writings) as useful solely to give
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The problem with the realist description of the judge as having
discretion to do what he pleased was that it appeared to license the
judge to do what he pleased. Realists meant that judges practically
speaking have the power to do what they please, not that they
have the right to do so. But some judges thought the realist analysis might be applied to justify dispensing with their obligation, in
deciding particular cases, to make law in the way that the community expects law to be made. 17 In fact, the legal community tolerates a wide degree of judicial discretion because it relies on judges
to make decisions in the manner expected of them. And what is
expected of them is that they try to achieve just results.
When judges violate their obligation to conform to the expectations of the legal community, as happened in the famous example
of Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co.,1 8 the resulting criticism
contains all the bitterness of betrayed trust.19 Although the statute
interpreted was not a model of clarity, 20 its underlying purposes

judges discretion in avoiding having juries decide issues of fact. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 595(A) (C. Kaufman Supp. 1980).
17. I am reminded of the following anecdote, probably apocryphal, which I picked up in
law school: It was said that a legal realist was appointed to the bench, and after a few
months an acquaintance had occasion to discuss his work with him. The acquaintance remarked that it must be easier for him than for other judges, knowing as he did the truth
that judges have the discretion to hold for the side they choose. "Oh no," said the realist,
"that description of judging works fine when you are looking at what judges do from the
outside, but when you're the judge, you've got to believe!"
Despite a "no atheists in foxholes" quality to this story, there is something more. There
is no point in being a judge if one does not believe in right and wrong, better decisions and
worse decisions, justice and injustice. It would be unrealistic to assume that most judges
took the job desiring to dedicate their lives to an exercise in nothingness. The only sensible
assumption we can make is that most judges care about justice.
18. 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962). In Roto-Lith, a "battle of the forms" case, the buying
offeror was held bound by the seller's disclaimer despite section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See id. at 500; U.C.C. § 2-207 (1972 version) (between merchants terms additional to those offered do not become part of the contract if they materially alter it).
19. Who can forget the pungent quotation from Bentham, "Not a grain of corn in this
dunghill!" See R.

SPEIDEL,

R.

SUMMERS & J. WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL

51 (2d ed. 1974).
20. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (1972 version). Section 2-207 provides:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states
terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance
is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;

AND CONSUMER LAW
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clearly excluded any attempt to make one writing an offer and the
other party's acts an acceptance.2 1 It clearly attempted to end the
hope for victory by one party's boilerplate in the battle of the
forms.2 2 When the Roto-Lith court, in the first significant case to
interpret the statute, held that its effect was that the last form
always won, dozens of critical commentaries appeared. 23 This inci-

(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of
those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.
Id. Translated into English, section 2-207 would read as follows:
(1) This section governs oral contracts confirmed by writings, and contracts created by
more than one writing. All these contracts include the terms on which the writings of the
parties agree. Oral contracts confirmed by writings also include the oral terms. Additionally,
between merchants all these contracts include terms that were not in the other party's writing nor the oral contract so long as they neither materially alter the deal nor are expressly
objected to.
(2) A contract is made whenever both parties send writings offering, accepting, or confirming a deal:
(a) unless at least one writing says there is no deal except on its conditions, and that statement is "express," and
(b) even then, a contract is still made if both parties act like they have a
contract. In that case, the contract also includes those terms ordinarily provided by the Code.
(3) "Express" or "expressly" in this section means either the statement is not standard form printing ("boilerplate"), or if it is, other circumstances in the transaction let the
other party know the sender really means it.
21. See U.C.C. § 2-207, Comment 7 (1972 version). Comment 7 states in part:
In many cases, as where goods are shipped, accepted and paid for before any
dispute arises, there is no queston whether a contract has been made. In such cases,
where the writings of the parties do not establish a contract, it is not necessary to
determine which act or document constituted the offer and which the acceptance.
Id.
22. See U.C.C. § 2-207, Comment 6 (1972 version). Comment 6 states in part:
Where clauses on confirming forms sent by both parties conflict each party must be
assumed to object to a clause of the other conflicting with one on the confirmation
sent by himself. As a result the requirement that there be notice of objection which is
found in subsection (2) is satisfied and the conflicting terms do not become a part of
the contract.
Id.
23. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-2, at 26-27 (1972) (Roto-Lith an "infamous" case "contrary to the
draftsman's policy . . . to whittle down the counter-offer rule"); Murray, Intention Over
Terms: An Exploration of UCC 2-207 and New Section 60, Restatement of Contracts, 37
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dent shows the legal community expected the court to follow the
policy of the statute regardless of its drafting and regardless of
whether some technical theory could be found to evade that policy.24 The court mistook its power to render a decision for either
side as sufficient to give it a right to render a decision contrary to
determinations of the legislative branch.
B.

The Relationship Between Law and Justice

If people get upset when judges ignore the prevailing standard of
justice in the community, as occurred in Roto-Lith, then this reaction may be taken as some evidence that our society expects that
justice is relevant to the job of judging. Furthermore, Roto-Lith is
not just an isolated case; rather, considerations of justice are always to be taken into account in the process of judging. In other
words, I shall try here to demonstrate the proper relationship between law and justice in our society: the purpose of the law is to do
justice. In a more civilized time that proposition will not seem startling; indeed, it may seem so obvious that discussion is
unnecessary.
I am not the first observer to notice that rules of law do not
actually decide particular cases. Karl Llewellyn discussed the
"Janus-faced" concept of precedent in The Bramble Bush.25
Holmes gave much earlier statements of this truth, however, in two
famous quotations. "The life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience," he said.2 6 Even more clearly, he said "General
propositions do not decide concrete cases. '2 7 But if rules of law do
not decide cases, then something else must; if actions speak louder
FORDHAM L. REV. 317, 330 (1969) (Roto-Lith court came to a "savage conclusion"); Corman,
The Law of Sales Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 14, 25 (1962)

("an intelligent reading of the statute leads to a result diametrically opposed to that of the
court"). But see Comment, A Look at a Strict Construction of Section 2-207 of the Uniform
Commercial Code From the Seller's Point of View or What's So Bad About Roto-Lith?, 8
AKRON L. REV. 111, 120-23 (1974).
24. This is why great judges often must make different decisions depending on whether
they judge in Kansas or New York, Texas or Massachusetts. This does not happen because
they make policy any differently, but because their respective state legislatures have arrived
at different balances of policy while deciding for one group or another in the clash of society's interests.
.25. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 64-69 (2d ed. 1951).
26. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881).
27. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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than words, something must explain, those actions. In fact, that
"something" is justice.
Applying the concept of "actions speak louder than words" to
judicial decisions creates the distinction between "holding" and
"dictum." Llewellyn claimed that the words used in a prior opinion
had no value as holding or dictum until a subsequent court decided whether they were welcome or unwelcome. If unwelcome, the
later court would distinguish the language as "dictum" if it could,
which need not be followed. If the court welcomed the language,
the distinction between "holding" and "dictum" was unnecessary;
the court could cite and follow the language regardless of whether
8
2
it was a "holding" the court was obligated to respect.

This realist insight has important consequences for the law student, the lawyer, and the judge. For the law student, it makes possible his understanding how the law evolves. For the lawyer, it implies that his task in every litigated case is twofold: first he must
find a way to persuade the court that justice is on his side; then he
must find a way the court can use procedurally to render a decision
for his side without looking foolish.2 Of course, it may be possible
to dispense with one of the two elements on occasion. If a
hometown judge is asked to render a decision against a hometown
football team, he may have an initial feeling before he even hears
the case as for which side he would like to find the justice.30 By
similar token the procedural path may be equally clear.8 1
So far I have said this is the way the system really works, a proposition of interest chiefly to the student and the lawyer, rather
than the judge. But I want to go one step beyond earlier legal realists, and assert that this is also the way things ought to be.
No doubt the relationship between "ought" and "is" could be
debated endlessly by philosophers. Lacking the time and space (if
28. See K.

LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH

66-69 (2d ed. 1951).

29. I have been teaching this insight to my students for some years now. One of them
mentioned this theory to a lawyer in a job interview. The lawyer was unimpressed: "Around
here we just call that giving the judge something to hang his hat on." Ever since hearing this
I have remembered this insight as the "judicial hat-rack" method of winning cases.

30. See Diamond v. University of Southern California, 89 Cal. Rptr. 302, 305 (Ct. App.
1970) (breach of option to purchase Rose Bowl tickets offered to season ticket holders),

cited in,

CORBIN ON CONTRACTS

§ 692 (C. Kaufman Supp. 1980).

31. Hopefully, if both the justice and the method of arriving at the just result were
clear, lawyers on both sides would be competent enough to see it, and the case would be
settled.
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not the interest) to do so here, I assume that "oughtness" has three
different sources: (1) something "ought" to be done because it is
prescribed by an authoritative source;32 (2) something "ought" to
be done because it is what people want;ss and, (3) something

"ought" to be done because it is what is good for people. 4 Formalist legal theory claimed to believe in authoritative sources: judges
"ought" to do things because that is what it said in the precedents.
Once it is shown that the "precedents" do not really bind, that
judges are free, then this method of proving "oughtness" is
unworkable.
In Western society, the law has always followed the second or
third method. The great legal thinkers always followed the second
method, but there was a time when the intellectual arrogance of
those wishing to impose their own vision of what is "good" on society forced the better view into dissent.35 Western society has
evolved a more or less workable method (or two) of determining
what people want; we have delegated the power to determine disputes about what people really want to the legislature 8 Judges are
32. Beutel says this is how religious systems get their lists of "oughts"; he calls this
method of deriving them "dogmatism." I prefer not to use this term because it connotes a
writing or doctrine ("dogma"). But the same obedience to authority can be seen where persons are elevated to infallibility, as in the case of Hitler, the Rev. Jim Jones, who died with
his followers at Jonestown, Guyana, or even our own Supreme Court in the New Deal era. A
special case of this method is the proposition, "this 'ought' to be, because it is what I want."
33. A variation on this theme is the proposition, "this may not be what people really
want, but it would be if they thought about it properly." John Rawls sets up as an "original
position," which he claims meets this test of being so structured, what people would want if
they thought about it right. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTIcE 41-45 (1971). I do not
believe it is possible to be sure what all hypothetical people would hypothesize if placed in a
hypothetical situation and asked to think about something. This method of proceeding is
just a way of ignoring what other people want in favor of justifying what the writer wants.
See Kaufman, The Nature of Justice: John Rawls and Pure ProceduralJustice, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 197, 223 (1980).
34. This is, of course, the methodology of Marxism, utilitarianism, capitalism, elitism,
and a great many other "isms," none of which has any necessary or particular relationship
to law. The difficulty with this method of supplying "oughts" is not so much in calculating
the truth of the proposition, "this is good for people." Theorists of this sort usually give
some definition of "good" that people can theoretically use to try to measure the truth of
their propositions. The real philosophical problem is in their claim that their conception of
what is "good" is so superior to yours or mine or Joe Doakes that we ought to be bound by
it. See id. at 224.
35. So in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Mr. Justice Holmes was forced to
say in dissent, "The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."
Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
36. Some also say the jury is a mechanism for determining what the community really
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to be bound by the legislative resolution of these disputes; but
when the legislature has resolved nothing, judges are not so bound.
Judges should not be considered at sea in such a case, helpless 3to7
figure out what rule should be applied to resolve the dispute.
Rather, they should suppose that the relevant principles of justice
are not in dispute, and the legislature is entitled to expect that
judges will make the best decision (most in accordance with what
is just) they can.
It can be argued that if "this ought to be because I want it so" is
not a position worthy of respect, neither is the position "this ought
to be because society wants it so." This argument falls into the
error economists call the "fallacy of scale," the assumption that the
actions of the mass are no different from the actions of the individual. 8 If one person's view of what is just is to prevail, he can control the outcome to favor his own interests or skew the results in
favor of his own particular biases. If the common or shared views
of what is just control, a basis for justice exists independent of the
will, integrity, or limitations of any particular person. 9
Others have argued that in fact our legal system reflects our society's understanding that the government exists, with certain fundamental exceptions known as "constitutional rights," for the purpose of guaranteeing that what society in general wants badly
enough will get done. 0 But I will not rely on the opinions of
wants. Others, like Frank, bitterly disagree. See J. FRANK,

LAW AND THE MODERN MIND

176-

77 note (1930) (quoting Holmes). But that is outside the scope of this article.
37. See my criticism of the "Myth of the All-Seeing and Indefatigable Legislature" in
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 724(A)(1) (C. Kaufman Supp. 1980). I borrowed this idea from
Dean Albert Sacks and the late Professor Henry Hart of Harvard.
38. To illustrate, consider the spectator in the football stadium-if one spectator stands
up, he improves his view of the action, but if everyone stands, spectators generally do not
improve their view.
39. I am reminded here of the "Kung Fu" doctrine of stare decisis, named from a passage in the television series Kung Fu, which went something like this: "What is as soft as a
drop of water, Grasshopper? Or as weak as the gentle breeze? Yet, when many drops of
water and many breezes come together, Grasshopper, they form the mighty hurricane which
nothing on earth can defeat." This was how I used to explain to students that courts can
legitimately ignore one critical law review article, but a unanimous storm of legal criticism
obligates them to follow the general understanding of the legal profession.
40. Taking a more realistic view, which doubts the real strength of the exception, is
Learned Hand: "Liberty is so much latitude as the powerful choose to accord to the
weak. . . . [TIolerance ends where faith begins." See L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 55-56
(1930). To be sure, Hand was talking of the world as it is, not as it should be; he meant this
passage in criticism of others, for he himself thought the constitutional guarantees to mean
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others; I will rely on the scientific method.
The scientific method demands looking at the data and drawing
a hypothesis to explain it. 1 In law we have objective data available
to all in the recorded decisions of courts and legislatures.' 2 If we
discover principles of justice running consistently through these recorded decisions, we, as scientists, are obliged to infer this is not
pure coincidence. We are obliged to infer that there is a reason
why decisions of courts and legislatures reflect principles of justice.
The scientist may infer, and I do infer, that this reason is probably
that our society believes reflecting justice is a legitimate function
of law.4 3 This inference is strengthened by examples of criticism of
judges who do not follow accepted standards of justice, as discussed in connection with Roto-Lith. This inference is strengthened further when we consider the alternatives. If we do not want
judges to decide between two different possible decisions (either of
which can be justified under accepted rules of law), on the basis of
which decision will most advance justice, on what ground do we
want judges to decide? We do not glory in the biases of individual
judges in this society, nor do we accept the concept of judges taking bribes and rendering judgment for the highest bidder. We do
not even accept judgment by roll of the dice." In short, I challenge

something to the willing eye. See id. at 56-57.
41. For the argument that the scientific method demands inductive reasoning, as the
superior and more accurate method of thinking than deductive reasoning, see Kaufman, The
Nature of Justice: John Rawls and Pure Procedural Justice, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 197, 201
(1980).
42. Frank appears to believe this recorded data is invalid because it has been filtered

through the biases and thought processes of judges. See J.

FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND 268 note (1930). But all human actions have been filtered through someone's biases

and thought processes. It is senseless to complain of the data when it is the only data you
have and the best that can be obtained. A more sensible view is taken by Llewellyn, who
advises reading cases "as an historian would read a document-looking for evidence of bias,
of omission, of distortion." See K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 58 (2d ed. 1951). In
other words, you can be skeptical of your data, but you cannot refuse to consider it at all;
otherwise your own biases come through instead of those of dozens of judges-and your own
are much more subject to manipulation and abuse, consisting as they do of the views of only
one person.
43. We are not obliged to find that all these decisions reflect principles of justice. We
are permitted to believe that some judges, say Mr. Justice Holmes, are juster than other
judges, say the Nixon Court. The same is true of legislatures; some can be bribed. See
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.) (sustaining demurrer to
allegations that state legislature was bribed to pass a statute).

44. See J. FRANK,

LAW AND THE MODERN MIND

145 (1930) (discussing Hutcheson's first

encounter with the "judicial hunch," to which the judge resorted because he could not legiti-
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anyone to tell us what else judges should use to decide between
two legitimate alternatives which would better explain what we
want judges to do, other than the inference that we want judges to
do justice."
It may be objected that I have failed thus far to define "justice."
So I have. That is not by accident; I believe that "justice" is more
accurately understood when one does not start from a pre-conceived notion of what it should be, and then look for supporting
data in the cases and statutes. Instead, one should begin with the
data and try to discover what just explanation there could be for
different lines of cases or statutes. Over time, one will hammer out
principles of justice from which one can induce what the essential
mately use dice). It should go without saying that I believe very often the "judicial hunch"
consists of the perception of the judge's subconscious that a decision, for one side or the
other, will advance justice to a greater extent than one for the other. The aim of this article
is to take justice out of the realm of the subconscious hunch and into the open where lawyers may argue about it. This will allow judges a sense of justice to be refined and improved
by the arguments of counsel.
45. One alternative to the "Do justice" formulation of the duties of judges I have come
across before is the quotation attributed to Mr. Justice Holmes, "Do justice? That is not my
job; my job is to play the game according to the rules." See Kaufman, Bringing Chaos Out
of Order: Truth in Lending in the Courts, 10 GA. L. REV. 937, 943 (1976). I do not believe
this article opposes the great judge. I understand Holmes to mean here that a judge cannot
avoid carrying out a legislative intent even if he thinks that intent to be unjust according to
his own lights. But I assume in deriving the principles of justice a duty of judges to let
legislatures make the decisions entrusted to their sphere of competence. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra. I understand Holmes to mean here that justice can be found in the
rules of law which exist, and that it is dangerous to license judges to give only the unguided
instinct of their unchecked consciences as grounds for decision in particular cases. Llewellyn
would agree with this; he points out that good judges can always find a way to manipulate
precedents to derive new and just rules; lesser judges are much more bound by the balance
of justice struck by the past. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 68 (2d ed. 1951). I have
said that the decisions of the mass of judges and legislators are much more accurate in
measuring society's understanding of what is just than any single decision of any particular
judge. See text accompanying notes 37-39, supra. Cf. Kaufman, The Nature of Justice:
John Rawls and Pure ProceduralJustice, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 197, 205-06 n.39 (1980) (discussing "Solomonic justice" and noting Pound's view that "only a saint" may be trusted
with non-rule-oriented style of decision-making); Kaufman, Bringing Chaos Out of Order:
Truth in Lending in the Courts, 10 GA. L. REV. 937, 944 n.25 (1976) (complaining of tendency for error when relatively experienced judges are reviewed by relatively inexperienced
ones).
On the other hand, I wonder whether judges might not play the game better if the rules
were understood as existing for a reason, because they reflect justice. When judges then
"play the game according to the rules," they would understand that when the reason for the
rule ceases, the rule also ceases. See Part III, Rule 10 infra. The rules would be better
tailored and would better reflect justice, and judges would then do a better job.
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nature of justice is.
III.

THE FOURTEEN PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE

There is nothing inevitable about the number fourteen. At one
point I had more than twenty principles of justice, before boiling
them down to eleven. I discovered that when principles of justice
get too specific, they begin to operate like rules of law which only
explain a specific line or two of cases, and are not useful in deciding new situations. I have also tried reducing these principles into
one great central concept. In that attempt I was successful in part;
I could classify all the principles of justice into two categories: procedural justice and substantive justice. Substantive justice is just
because of the substantive values of society. Procedural justice includes those rules necessary if any decision-making procedure is to
be fair. At one time I thought procedural justice inherently more
fundamental than substantive justice."6 I still think that, as an abstract matter, but in practice I have ranked a rule of substantive
justice as the most important in deciding cases in our society. 7
John Rawls claims it is impossible to rank principles of justice in
an absolute "lexical order. ' ' 48 And I do not mean to do so here. An

actual fact pattern may arise wherein judgment for one side would
serve the first principle of justice while the second, fourth, and
fifth principles would be served by a decision for the other side;
the court might decide for the latter as having the weight of justice. A contrary decision upholding the first principle would upset
the overall scheme of justice. I am not hoping for mathematical
certainty, but simple recognition that a rough guide to the relative
importance of competing principles is better than nothing.
Rule 1: Justice Demands that No One Should Profit by His Own
Wrong (i.e., by Defeating the Reasonable Expectations of Others).
While working on the 1980 supplement to Corbin on Contracts,I
46. See Kaufman, The Nature of Justice: John Rawls and Pure ProceduralJustice, 19
WASHBURN L.J. 197, 215 (1980).
47. I have found it necessary to stick with statements of intermediate generality. The
two basic categories (sources) of principles of justice were too vague and abstract, too disconnected from reality, to be of use in deciding whether a judge was right or wrong in deciding a particular case.
48. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 43 (1971).
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happened upon Mr. Justice Cardozo's explanation that waiver and
estoppel are specific examples of a more basic general principle
that nobody should profit by his own wrong.4 9 I was impressed by
this insight, and wondered if there might not be two or three other
principles of justice out of which our specific legal rules have been
crystallized. Thereafter, whenever a court announced a principle of
law in a case I was noting for the supplement to Corbin, I asked
myself whether that principle of law achieved justice (and if it did
not seem to in the particular case, whether I could conceive of
other cases where it would, or whether possibly it did at the time
and under the circumstances in which the rule evolved). That inquiry led to these fourteen principles of justice.5 0
The problem with Mr. Justice Cardozo's formulation is its failure to explain what a "wrong" is. In that sense it could not decide
concrete cases since a judge who wished to avoid the principle
would refuse to call particular conduct a "wrong," and a judge who
wished to invoke the principle would be permitted to call even innocent conduct a "wrong." Fortunately, I had before me at the
time Professor Corbin's explanation of what is a wrong when contract law is involved. In section one of Corbin on Contracts he explained that contract law is to protect the reasonable expectations
of parties induced by promises." In contract law then, a wrong is a
breach of a party's promise-induced reasonable expectations. I saw
no reason why deletion of the contract law limitation would not
produce a suitable explanation of a "wrong" generally. I tried the
formulation, "Justice demands that no one profit by defeating the
reasonable expectations of others." While it is more accurate, the
phraseology is less familiar; most of the courts which have stated
this principle have said that "no man should profit by his own
wrong." 2
I rejected the idea that a wrong is what the legislature says it is.
49. See Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 127 N.E. 263, 266 (N.Y. 1920) (Cardozo, J., concurring). Holmes claimed the alternative formulation of this first principle of justice, that
we have a duty not to defeat the reasonable expectations of others, is the true explanation
behind the doctrine of "adverse possession" in the law of property. See Holmes, The Path
of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476-77 (1897).
50. Since I have been studying contract law almost exclusively while deriving these
principles, they could very well be seriously incomplete.
51. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1, at 1-2 (1963).
52. See Simonson v. Sinsheimer, 95 F. 948, 952 (6th Cir. 1899) (Taft, J.). See also the
formulation in note 125 infra.
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First, I noticed this definition of a "wrong" was being applied in
"illegal contract" decisions. The traditional formulation of illegal
contract rules was that since the state had outlawed particular
kinds of contracts, both parties had committed a wrong in making
such a contract; therefore, neither party would be allowed to sue to
enforce it, since they would be permitted to profit from the making
of the contract.5 But the state's idea of a wrong and the reasonable expectations of the parties may be two different things; I noticed that courts were reluctant to apply the rule when the parties
were in good faith and in conformity with the changing mores of
the times. 4 I then had the insight that the existence of a statute or
other state judgment concerning conduct is only relevant in determining whether the expectations which do exist are reasonable; it
cannot insure that people will actually have certain expectations.
Or, in another case, I noticed that there are statutes making money
legal tender, but this cannot be conclusive on the question whether
contracting parties actually expected to pay in legal tender. 55 The
Uniform Commercial Code, on the contrary, recognizes that very
often it would greatly defeat the reasonable expectations of a contracting party for someone else to insist on payment by legal
tender instead of by check, bankwire, or whatever.5 If a legal
tender statute cannot supply an expectation of payment in legal
tender, nor a statute against fornication or cohabitation supply an

53. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1476 (consideration of sexual intercourse), 1478 (wagering contests) (1962).
54. See Cougler v. Fackler, 510 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Ky. 1974) (contract between prostitute
and alleged customer not necessarily invalid because of illegal relationship); Tyranski v. Piggins, 205 N.W.2d 595, 596 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (contract between cohabitating parties
enforceable if independent of illicit relationship); Latham v. Latham, 547 P.2d 144, 145 (Or.
1976) (contract in consideration of providing "amenities of married life" held enforceable in
light of state repealing law against cohabitation); cf. Green v. Richmond, 337 N.E.2d 691,
698 (Mass. 1975) (contract price admissible in quantum meruit action where decedent had
promised to leave plaintiff his estate if she would "stay" with him, but died without devising
property to her).
55. Cf. 31 U.S.C. § 459 (1976) (silver coins denominated less than one dollar legal
tender for payments not exceeding ten dollars); id. § 460 (minor coins legal tender for payments not exceeding twenty-five cents).
56. See U.C.C. § 2-511(2) (1972 version). Subsection (2) provides that "Tender of payment is sufficient when made by any means or in any manner current in the ordinary course
of business unless the seller demands payment in legal tender and gives any extension of
time reasonably necessary to procure it." Id. The official comments note that "The essence
of the principle involved . . . is avoidance of commercial surprise at the time of performance." Id. § 2-511, Comment 3.
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expectation of wrongdoing by couples who live together, then it is
apparent that the state can only limit expectations, not supply
them.
If the parties did not reasonably expect their contract to be unenforceable because of their wrongdoing, the principle that "no one
should profit by his own wrong" does not apply. The contract may
still be unenforceable, but that is because of the state's judgment
that such contracts need to be deterred, and making them unenforceable is the most appropriate means of deterring them. There
may in fact be some other, more appropriate means of deterrence.
If the contract has been performed in part and both parties were
in good faith (i.e., both had honest states of mind), 7 then very
probably some party is going to profit by the contract. In that case,
the court cannot choose whether someone will profit, it can only
choose who will profit. If that is the choice available, the principle
of justice does not tell the court how to decide the case. The court
must find some other just basis of decision, probably the third
principle of justice discussed later.
One might also ask why the principle that no one should profit
by his own wrong is ranked first. I might have cited Corbin's judgment that this is the basic principle. But it is also true that I
would come to the same conclusion independently. While working
on the rules on "good faith," I was forced to consider whether Professor Summers was right in saying that "good faith" has no inherent content, it is only a lack of specific kinds of "bad faith." 8
When I concluded that good faith is a motive to adhere to the
spirit of the bargain, rather than the form, to live up to the reasonable expectations of others rather than the letter of one's obligations, then I decided that "good faith" is just another specific rule
of law that reflects the basic principle of justice that persons
should not profit by defeating the reasonable expectations of
others. Since good faith is one of the most important of the "universal solvents, ' ' 59 I concluded that this principle of justice must

57. See.generally CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 654A-6541 (C. Kaufman Supp. 1980).
58. See Summers, "Good Faith" in General ContractLaw and the Sales Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 199-207 (1968). Looking at Summers'
data, I came to a different conclusion; to be sure, courts found many different motives to be
"bad faith," but all of them were motives to act in ways calculated to defeat the other
party's reasonable expectations.
59. A "universal solvent" is a realist concept. If, as discussed in Part II, judges first
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indeed be fundamental.

decide where the justice is and then look for a legal theory to hold for that side, then a
"universal solvent" is a legal theory that will almost always be available, regardless of the
particular facts, as a means the court can use to hold for a particular side in some class of
cases. I mentioned "good faith" in contract cases. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1972 version). "Negligence" is the counterpart in torts; it also seems to be concerned with the standard of conduct that others may reasonably expect. "Inadvertence" is the universal alternative to "negligence"; it reflects the sixth principle of justice that "people don't have to be perfect." The
Uniform Commercial Code also makes "reasonableness" a universal solvent in Code cases.
See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1972 version) ("obligations of . . . reasonableness . . . may not be
disclaimed"). I suspect what the drafters had in mind is similar to what I call "fairness" in
adhesion contract theory. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 554A-5541 (C. Kaufman Supp.
1980).
For most criminal lawyers, "reasonable doubt" is the universal solvent. But I believe
there is another one, which I call the Zenger principle, after the famous trial of a New York
printer for seditious libel in 1735, reported in the most famous pamphlet of pre-revoluntion-

ary America, J. ALEXANDER'S, A

BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER

(S. Katz 2d ed. 1972). Zenger had run a newspaper critical of the royal governor.
After the chief justice (appointed by the governor) disbarred Alexander and another,
Zenger's original counsel, he was forced to import Alexander Hamilton from Philadelphia
(the origin of the myth of the "Philadelphia lawyer"). Although truth was not a defense to
seditious libel under the law, Hamilton's argument was that the jury had the power to acquit in the interests of justice if it believed Zenger ought not be punished for printing the
truth. See id. at 23-24.
ZENGER

The Zenger principle, then, amounts to the principle that the jury may always acquit, if
it feels justice would be served. I have been asked if this principle is something counsel
could get an instruction on. Although I know of no precedents on the issue, I see no reason
why not. In 1770, the Sons of Liberty arranged for the "Brief Narrative" to be reprinted
when one of their leaders was indicted for libel for criticizing the New York Assembly. See
id. at 30. Until the debunkers of modern times, historians saw this trial as an important
precedent for freedom of the press, explaining why our founders felt necessary for maintaining trial by jury. See id. at 5. Certainly, the case must have been in the minds of the leaders
of the American Revolution.
The problem with a jury instruction is the Zenger principle is not a plea of innocence,
but a plea that society would be better served if no conviction were returned. In that sense,
it is an appeal to those factors usually taken into account on sentencing. If the jury is to be
told it may acquit despite guilt under the right circumstances, justice demands that the
prosecution must have its chance to prove the circumstances are otherwise. So, if the defendant claims it is so unwise to convict ordinary potsmokers that the jury should acquit him of
possession of marijuana, the prosecution needs the opportunity to assert this defendant is
not an ordinary potsmoker, but a major cocaine importer. It is thus only just that the condition of granting the instruction be that the prosecution can put in its sentencing evidence at
the conviction phase of the jury trial. If that is true, the Zenger principle is a universal
solvent only for first offenders, and similar relatively appealing defendants-though I suppose nothing would prevent a defendant from forgetting the instruction and relying only on
oral argument.
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Rule 2: It Is Just that a Man Be Allowed To Do as He Pleases,
So Long as He Does Not Upset His Neighbors.
Unlike the first principle, which was substantive, 0 this principle
of justice is procedural 1 In contract law this principle can be seen
60. One demanded by the values of society. I once read a science fiction story about a
cori man who bought a valuable product from a planet by passing counterfeit currency. The
planet so valued cleverness and successful trickery that it gave him a monopoly on the product's export as a reward for his superior conmanship, on the condition, however, that he
only pay in counterfeit currency. When he got back home, his own government threatened
to jail him if he passed any more counterfeits of its currency. So when he went back to the
planet, he passed off genuine bills as counterfeits and became an even greater planetary
hero. Obviously such a society would never accept this first principle of justice; nor would
the African Ik tribe, discussed in C. TURNBULL, THE MOUNTAIN PEOPLE 135 (1972) and Kaufman, The Nature of Justice: John Rawls and Pure ProceduralJustice, 19 WASHBURN L.J.
197, 203 n.28 1980) (world's "ickiest" society noted for neglecting its children).
61. Although doubtless the distinction between "substantive" and "procedural" means
something to most lawyers, perhaps the following example adds clarity: suppose that the
United States decided Iran had jacked the price of oil above OPEC guidelines and was
charging an unconscionably high price. That would be a question of substantive justice.
Then suppose that the United States decided that the proper way to adjudicate whether
Iran charged too much for its oil was to kidnap the Ayatollah Khomeini and forty-nine
other Iranian government officials and employees and hold them hostage until Iran agreed
to lower oil prices. This would be a question of procedural justice. I do not mean to imply
that this division between "substantive" and "procedural" is a necessary one, just one that
works satisfactorily for purposes of legal analysis. Actually, I know of three (and, so far, only
three) ways of convincing someone of the truth of any proposition. One can appeal to shared
(identical) values: "You and I both belong to OPEC; let's raise the price of oil and we will
improve our position in the world." Or, one can appeal to reciprocal (different) values: "You
produce oil and I produce food; why don't I trade you some food for some of your oil, and
then we will both be better off." Or, again, one can appeal to comparable (analagous) values:
"You wouldn't be willing to bargain with us if we kidnapped the Ayatollah Khomeini and
forty-nine other people associated with the Iranian government, so you can't expect us to
bargain with you when you hold fifty of our government's employees hostage." In law, the
distinction between "shared" and "reciprocal" values usually is not crucial; a decision based
on either kind of analysis would be a "substantive" question of justice. In economics, however, the distinction is crucial. Obviously, reasoning by analogy always raises questions of
procedural justice. Our society values procedural justice ("Is this the right way to go about
deciding?" or "Would it be fair to the Shah to deliver him to the Iranian government for
trial?") more highly than substantive justice ("Is this the right decision?" or "Is the Shah
really a criminal against humanity under the standards established at Nuremberg?") because it does not generally believe it is possible for anyone to have a monopoly on the truth.
Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig-

ion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press"). Thus, people can always disagree with any substantive judicial result in our society.
Compare the Iranian concept of the "imam" (a living saint supposed to be incapable of
error). Obviously if one believes an "imam" is deciding on the merits (and apparently many
Iranians believe the Ayatollah Khomeini is an "imam"), it is easier to ignore questions of
rightness and wrongness in how he proceeds in deciding things. Of course this ignores cause
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at work in the old rules of "freedom of contract"6 and in the requirement of "consideration." 683 Very likely a great deal of injustice
has been done in the past in the name of this principle. Usually
this has occurred because courts failed to notice that the right to
do what one pleases is only the second (subordinate in value to the
first) principle of justice and has inherent limitations. Those limitations are powerfully put in the American folk saying, "The freedom to swing your arm ends where the other fellow's nose begins."
More and more courts are beginning to understand that "freedom
of contract" only applies when no wrong is being done to one of
the contracting parties. Modern courts are, therefore, developing
adhesion contract theory to insure that the public's reasonable expectations of fair treatment at the hands of businesses are not defeated by unfair and one-sided forms.
Learned Hand made a good case for the proposition that, considered in the abstract, the principle should actually read, "it is just
that a man be allowed to do what he pleases, so long as he does not
harm his neighbors. ' 64 Unfortunately, he agreed that this is not
the principle of justice societies actually use. Society has always
felt "harmed" by conduct that upsets it sufficiently; witness the
Prohibition experiment. Further, Judge Hand pointed out that "if
a community decides that some conduct is prejudicial to itself, and
so decides by numbers sufficient to impose its will on dissenters, I
know of no principle which can stay its hand.

65

Still, this principle

of justice can be used to show that our society is more just than
that of Russia."
I have tried to show elsewhere that the question when people
should have a "liberty" is always inherently a question of
and effect; scientifically, one cannot presuppose that somebody is an "imam" and then define everything he says as being truth and justice. Instead, the would-be "imam" demonstrates his adherence to the standards of conduct required by always proceeding in a just
manner. If one falls short of the standards of justice in procedure, he cannot be an "imam,"
and nobody can be expected to believe his decision on the substantive merits of the case
(i.e., "the Shah is a war criminal") either.
62. See generally CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 559A-559L (C. Kaufman Supp. 1980).
63. See generally Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 929
(1958).

64. See L.

HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY

55-56 (1952).

65. Id. at 55-56.
66. See Kaufman, The Nature of Justice: John Rawls and Pure ProceduralJustice, 19
WASHBURN

L.J. 197, 217 (1980).
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procedural justice."7 Therefore, I will not go deeply into the question of which "liberty" is procedural justice here. Suffice it to say
this definition of "justice" is only procedural because the question
when a society is sufficiently "upset" is defined out, and permitted
to be varied from society to society. The question, "How much liberty does this society believe in before it will get upset by particular conduct" is a substantive question, but I cannot believe any
useful purpose will be served by trying to answer that question for
our society in this article.
Rule 3: Other Things Being Equal, Justice Is What Serves the
Needs of Society (i.e., the Needs of Commerce).
The alternative formulation-equating the needs of commerce
with the needs of society-is one that seems obvious in Western
society, but one that probably would be rejected in a thoroughly
Marxist society. This principle can be detected in some of the
"public policy" -cases," as well as an occasional commercial case
where the court argues that "the wheels
of commerce would grind
to a halt" if it held the other way. ee
Rule 4: It Is Just To Place Loss on a Party to the Extent He
Could Have Prevented Loss, But if No One Could Avoid Loss,
Loss Lies Where It Falls.
This appears to be the basic principle of justice at work in the
law of torts. The common law's insistence on "fault" (i.e., "negligence") as a prerequisite to recovery for unintentional torts (before
"strict liability" developed) is probably traceable to this principle
of justice and its insistence on ability to avoid harm being the basis

67. See id. at 197 (first and second things a ruler would agree to in a proper "original
position"); Kaufman, The Resurrection of Contract, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 38, 59-60 (1977)
(five procedural superiorities of a regime of liberty over a regime of prescription).
68. See, e.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972); In re Gulf &
Midlands Barge Line, Inc., 509 F.2d 713, 722-23 (5th Cir. 1975); Ferguson v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 370 P.2d 379, 387 (Kan. 1962).
69. See Bowling Green, Inc. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 425 F.2d 81, 85 (1st Cir.
1970); Park State Bank v. Arena Auto Auction, Inc., 207 N.E.2d 158, 160 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965)
(Petersen, J.) ("bring those wheels of the banking business to an astounding and abrupt
halt"); cf. Citizens Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 334 F.2d 257, 260 (10th Cir. 1964)
(holding otherwise "would cast a burden upon commercial transactions which they can ill
afford").
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of liability. In The Resurrection of Contract,70 I first identified this
principle of the common law, and argued that a more accurate explanation of the rise of "strict liability" was a more sophisticated
understanding that a manufacturer often could have avoided harm
even in cases when he was not negligent."1
When writing The Resurrection of Contract I thought this principle of justice (not then part of any general theory of the relationship between law and justice) was probably the most fundamental.
I have repented of that view. I have not changed my opinion that
the "holder in due course" doctrine 72 is directly derived from this
principle of justice.73 Two or three hundred years ago, it was
thought that the maker or drawer of a negotiable instrument by
creating it and "setting it afloat upon a sea of strangers" 4 was
chiefly the person who created the risk that someone must bear
loss because he had personal defenses against the original payee.
However, in those days promissory notes effectively functioned as
currency, and a single negotiable instrument might circulate to as
many as two hundred persons before being retired from circulation. 5 In modern times, it seems that the existence of a finance
company willing to discount consumer paper for a crook creates
70. Kaufman, The Resurrection of Contract, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 38 (1977).
71. See id. at 63-65. I do not agree with the alternative formulation some students keep
trying out on me: that it is just to place loss on the party who could "best bear it." That is
just the "deep pocket" doctrine ("soak the rich") in another guise. The actions of legislatures in blood hepatitis cases seem to demonstrate that strict liability is based on this legitimate understanding of the justice involved, not on the "deep pocket" doctrine. See id. at 64
n.93.
72. The Uniform Commercial Code defines a holder in due course as "a holder who
takes a negotiable instrument (a) for value; and (b) in good faith; and (c) without notice
that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part
of any person." See U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (1972 version). For a detailed discussion of the origin
and development of the doctrine, see Succession of Baker, 55 So. 714, 719 (La. 1911) ("the
maxim . . . is especially true of rules grown up in jurisprudence. These rules are binding by
authority of reason, rather than by reason of authority").
73. Accord, Burchett v. Allied Concord Financial Corp., 396 P.2d 186, 190 (N.M. 1964).
In Burchett the makers of promissory notes, procured through false representations, were
denied cancellation of the notes in the hands of a holder in due course. See id. at 187, 19192. Although fraud in the inducement generally may be raised against a holder in due
course, it may not be raised if there was reasonable opportunity to discover the character of
the representations inducing the execution of the contract. Id. at 190; see U.C.C. § 3-305(2)
(1972 version).
74. U.C.C. § 3-406, Comment 2 (1972 version).
75. Cf. E. WooD, ENGLISH THEORIES OF CENTRAL BANKING CONTROL 17 n.44 (1939) (minimum of 20 endorsements required to treat bill of exchange as money).
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the risk of loss through crooked and deceptive practices being
practiced on members of the public. 76 Today, promissory notes do
not circulate to "a sea of strangers"; they usually circulate only
once, to a single assignee who is usually better able to discover and
prevent wrongdoing by the person with whom he deals than those
members of the public whose obligations are being assigned. To be
sure, some negotiable instruments are still used as a commercial
medium of payment," but none of these are promissory notes. For
instruments that function as money, the holder in due course doctrine is appropriate and valuable, placing loss on the party who
could best have prevented it; but this is not true of those "negotiable" instruments no longer serving as money in commercial
practice.
A concept which seems very similar to this principle of justice on
the prevention of loss is this: As between competing interests, it is
just that gain go to the party that contributed the most to its
production. This seems to be the principle behind the provisions of
article nine of the Uniform Commercial Code allowing priority to
purchase money security interests.7 8 Again, this seems to have been
the idea behind allowing priority to current year financers of farm79
ers' crops over financers who advanced money in prior years.
Again, possibly this is the principle that has persuaded legislatures
to give mechanics' and materialmen's liens priority over competing
security interests.
I have not treated this as a separate principle of justice because I
am convinced it is merely a corollary of the main principle. Both
this and the main formulation seem to be expressions of some
deeper concept of the relationship between means and ends, of
proportionality between cause and effect; a relationship that I can
picture clearly but have difficulty trying to describe verbally.

76. See Rohner, Holder in Due Course in Consumer Transactions:Requiem, Revival,
or Reformation?, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 503, 530 (1975).
77. Checks and international bills of exchange still function as money, as well as some
trade acceptances such as that involved in Newark Steel Drum Co. v. Penn Crest Oil &
Grease Corp., 4 U.C.C. Rep. 316, 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
78. See U.C.C. §§ 9-107, 9-312 (1972 version).
79. See id. § 9-312(2).
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Rule 5: Justice Will Hold a Man at Least to the Minimum Obligation He Consciously Assumed.
This principle of justice probably explains the rise of the "meeting of the minds" theory of contract law. 0 The theory began to die
when legal theorists began questioning whether it was not also just
to hold people to something more-to the obligation they induced
others to reasonably believe was assumed (objective theory).8 1 Still,
the principle has a pull and a continued vitality. I recall hearing an
operetta, The Frog Prince, when I was about four years old: "If
you make a promise keep it/That's the only thing to do./If you say
you will,/Your promises fulfill."
The rule Pacta sunt servanda 2 and the idea of enforcing only
the "dickered terms" 8 demonstrate the survival of this principle.
Again, "fraud in the inducement" and "mistake" are doctrines reflecting society's understanding that it is the conscious understanding of people that justifies holding them liable on their
promises 4 The concept of "minority" likewise follows from this
and the perception that understanding takes a while to develop.8 6
The principle is also applied in cases refusing to allow a person out
of a contractual obligation on the ground that his own obligation
was illusory.8 6 Again, the principle supports refusing to impose liability in quasi-contract or unjust enrichment for benefits he was
87
not aware anyone might expect him to pay for.

80. See generally Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365 (1921).
81. See Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D. N.Y. 1911) (L. Hand, J.)
("A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of
the parties").
82. "Agreements must be observed." See generally Sharp, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 41
COLUM. L. REV. 783 (1941).
83. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370-71 (1960); Kaufman, The
Resurrection of Contract, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 38, 42-46 (1977); cf. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 64(B) (C. Kaufman Supp. 1980) (discussion of "quasi-offer" cases).
84. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 597-612 (1960); cf. Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng.
Rep. 375, 375 (Ex. 1864) (the ships "Peerless") (no contract where parties contemplated two
different delivery ships by same name). See the discussion of possible error in "Peerless" in
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 536(D) (C. Kaufman Supp. 1980).
85. See generally Navin, The Contracts of Minors Viewed from the Perspective of Fair
Exchange, 50 N.C. L. REV. 517 (1972).
86. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 145(B)(1), 152(B)(4) (C. Kaufman Supp. 1980).
87. See id. § 19(B)(4),
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Rule 6: Justice Does Not Make a Man Give Something for
Nothing.

This principle can be reformulated as "Requiring windfalls is
not just." This principle also supports the doctrine of "consideration" in contract law,88 and supports allowing people to revoke
contracts to make gifts even when a technical consideration is present. 9 This principle sometimes appears as "freedom from contract"; it is why people are permitted to refuse to perform their
promises when the other party has only an illusory obligation. 0
Rule 7: People Don't Have to Be Perfect.
The classic example of this principle of justice is the rule De
minimis non curat lex. 9 1 The requirement of a "material breach"
of contract and the doctrine of "substantial performance" 92 reflect
this principle of justice in contract law. In torts, the concept of
"inadvertence" serves this function (meaning by inadvertence, a
failure to be perfect which, since typical and understandable, is not
negligent, even though harm to someone else resulted).9 3
Rule 8: Justice Is Served When the Powerful Must Treat the
Weak as Equals.
This principle is particularly apparent in fiduciary duty cases."
Although similar to the first principle of justice in supporting the
trend of the 'courts to require fairness from the drafters of adhesion contracts, the principle is yet distinct. Unlike its more powerful older relative, it applies even where the weak never had any
reason to expect fair treatment. On the other hand, where the
88. See generally Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 929
(1958).
89. See Fischer v. Union Trust Co., 101 N.W. 852, 855 (Mich. 1904).
90. See, e.g., Zeyher v. S.S. & S. Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 606, 607 (7th Cir. 1968); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Wroten, 303 A.2d 698, 701 (Del. Ch. 1973); Graphic Arts Finishers, Inc. v. Boston
Redev. Auth., 255 N.E.2d 793, 796 (Mass. 1970). See generally CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 145
(1963).
91. "The law does not concern itself with trifles."
92. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, C.J.).
93. See discussion of "inadvertance" as a universal solvent in note 59 supra.
94. See, e.g., Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 489-90 (3d Cir. 1976); Jones v. H.F.
Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471-74, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 599-602 (1969) (Traynor, C.J.);
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-18 (Mass. 1975).
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weak bargained for and had a right to expect special treatment, a
remedy under this principle of justice would give them less than
their reasonable expectations. Briefly, the reason why the rule in
fiduciary duty cases is "equality" is that the relationship is such
that more specific terms cannot be induced; while in good faith
cases, the "spirit of the bargain" allows much more accurate approximation of what the parties really expected.9
Rule 9: Justice Demands that Like Cases Be Treated Alike (i.e.,
that There Be Rules).
This principle of justice supports the doctrine of stare decisis,
and can also be detected in other doctrines, such as that of the
"law of the case," res judicata, and collateral estoppel."a This principle also supports the elevation of the substance of a transaction
over its form. 7 Since courts are continually elevating form over
substance whenever they feel the ends of commerce are being
served, as in the development of the "time-price" doctrine when
usury laws were unduly restrictive, 8 it seems apparent that this
principle of justice ranks well below the third one.
Rule 10: Justice Demands that Different Cases Be Treated Differently (i.e., that When the Reason for the Rule Ceases, the Rule
also Ceases).
This principle can be traced back to Coke. In Heydon's Case99
he discussed statutory construction, stating the substance of this
and the preceding principle of justice. Blackstone lifted the Latin
phrasing, Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex, from Coke on

95. For further discussion of the distinction between the concept of "fiduciary duty"
and the contract obligations of "good faith," see CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 654A(B) (C. Kaufman Supp. 1980).
96. An explanation of "Solomonic justice," or circumstances when the alternative formulation ("that there be rules") does not obtain can be found in Kaufman, The Nature of
Justice: John Rawls and Pure Procedural Justice, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 197, 205-06 n.39
(1980).
97. See Rippe v. Doran, 486 P.2d 107, 109 (Wash. App. 1971), discussed in CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 1326(A)(1) (C. Kaufman Supp. 1980) (breach of covenant not to compete "in
the City of Vancouver" found where seller opened competitive business three miles away,
but outside city limits).
98. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1500 (1962); id. § 1011(A)(1) (C. Kaufman Supp. 1980).
99. 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613).
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Littleton.100 Although the alternative formulation can be found directly in case law, 10 1 doubtless from Blackstone, very few people
are familiar with this principle today. The chief distinction between a lawyer and a bureaucrat is that the lawyer understands
this concept and the bureaucrat does not.102 Because of its obscurity, I have found it more useful in the practice of law and the
prediction of cases than any other.
This concept can be discovered in the rules concerning use of
precedent, the concept of legislative purpose, the distinction between dictum and holding, and the rules followed in statutory interpretation cases. The use of this concept is also found in adhe1 03
sion contract analysis.

This principle and the preceding principle of justice might well
have been combined, but I resisted the temptation to do so for
several reasons. Chiefly, this principle of justice seems to be universal, a procedural principle that any decision-maker must follow
in order to think clearly. The preceding principle is not. Many societies do not accept the ninth principle; even some modern, mass
societies might dispense with it.1 04 Secondarily, though my two re-

formulations of these principles ("Like cases should be treated
alike" and "Different cases should be treated differently") make
the connection between them seem clear enough, in their traditional formulations, the connection is much less obvious. And the
separate evolution of these two principles also supports separate
treatment.
Rule 11: It Is Unjust to Place a Person in a Double Bind.
The concept of the "double bind" can be found in Eric Berne's
Games People Play.10 5 An example is when a son gets two ties
from his parents for Christmas. The next morning he comes down
to breakfast wearing one. His parents ask, "What's the matter,
100. See BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 390-91 (American ed. 1847); COKE ON LITTLETON
70b (1628).
101. See Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1279 n.4 (Wyo. 1975); Chicago & N.W.
Ry. v. City of Riverton, 247 P.2d 660, 660-61 (Wyo. 1952).
102. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 865(B)(2) (C. Kaufman Supp. 1980).
103. Id. § 559G.

104. See Kaufman, The Nature of Justice: John Rawls and Pure Procedural Justice,
19 WASHBURN L.J. 197, 205-06 n.39 (1980).
105. E. BERNE, GAMES PEOPLE PLAY 93 (1964).
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didn't you like the other one?"' 106 In law the double bind most typically encountered is the situation where the law requires someone
to do something, and then the other party seeks to impose liability
on the acting party because of it. I encountered a couple of examples of this in doing the 1980 supplement to Corbin on
07

Contracts.1

This principle of justice has traditionally been found as the reason for judicial and official immunity. In fact, that is the chief justification advanced by Learned Hand for these doctrines in Gre5 where he said, "Again and again the public
goire v. Biddle,""
interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded on a
mistake, in the face of which an official may later find himself hard
put to satisfy a jury of his good faith." 09
Rule 12: Justice Requires Tailored Remedies Which Deter Only
Socially Harmful Conduct (i.e., the Law Should Not Penalize
Courtesy, Decency, and Common Humanity).
This rule is often found in cases where the courts refuse to find
that leniency and decency on the part of one party is a waiver or
estoppel." 0 Actually, I seem to find more instances to complain of
a violation of this principle of justice, than I find cases of compliance with it. The state of mind which occasionally leads courts to
violate this principle is one I call "bleeding heartism." This particular "ism" is characterized by an excess of sympathy for the poor
and the downtrodden, accompanied by a lack of understanding
that they are capable of doing evil things to the same extent as
106. See id. at 93.
107. See Skagway City School Bd. v. Davis, 543 P.2d 218, 226 (Alaska 1975) (damages
for loss of reputation denied where teacher fired for incompetence). Alaskan teachers are
protected by a statute requiring that they can only be fired for "cause"; it would be unjust
to penalize the school board for complying. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1007(B)(2) (C. Kaufman
Supp. 1980). See also id. § 1039A(B).
108. 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
109. Id. at 581; cf. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976) ("discretionary

function" exception). See generally H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1216-17 (1953); Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21
MINN. L. REv. 263, 271-72 (1937).
110. See, e.g., Four Sons Bakery, Inc. v. Dulman, 542 F.2d 829, 832 (10th Cir. 1976);
Frontier Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Trigleth, 505 S.W.2d 516, 517-18 (Ark. 1974); Mobile
Housing, Inc. v. Stone, 490 S.W.2d 611, 613-14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no writ). See
also CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1011(A)(1) (C. Kaufman Supp. 1980).
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more advantaged groups in society."' While in this state of mind,
they make rulings in favor of the poor and downtrodden which,
given the inevitable workings of human nature and the reactions of
those who will have to deal with the poor and downtrodden, make
the poor and downtrodden even worse off than they were before.' 12
This occurs because when courts fail to realize that their rulings
against those who tried to treat the poor and downtrodden fairly
put a premium on treating the poor and downtrodden badly. Only
a saint will try to treat the poor fairly if he is going to be penalized
for it. Most litigants involved in commercial and contract law today are not saints. We have sufficiently little reserves of good will,
tolerance, courtesy, humanity, and the like that courts should be
especially careful of rulings that discourage them.
A typical example of bleeding heartism is the majority rule followed in this country today on the evasion or refusal of notice of
sale of collateral by debtors who are aware that the secured party
is required to give them notice in order to obtain a deficiency judgment. 1 3 In the early days of the U.C.C., it was common practice
for security agreements to provide for certified mail notice to debtors of the resale of their collateral. Then a long series of decisions
held secured parties to be in violation of their notice obligation if
the debtor evaded or refused to sign." 4 This, coupled with decisions allowing secured parties to give oral notice of resale," 5 persuaded secured parties they had better change their ways. Instead
of proving to the court their good faith in trying to give debtors

111. Or, as Levy puts it, "Last guys don't finish nice." Levy, Levy's Nine Laws for the
Disillusionment of the True Liberal, 54 AIR FORCE MAGAZINE 64 (Aug. 1971). I do not mean
by this citation to imply that I am either illusioned or disillusioned (I have never beaten my
wife, thank you); I have always considered a realist philosophy sufficient antidote to either
extreme.
112. Another formulation of this concept has been called the "Crazy Eddie" doctrine.
See generally L. NIVEN & J. POURNELL, THE MOTE IN GOD's EYE (1975).
113. See generally Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 401 (1974).
114. See, e.g., In re Carter, 511 F.2d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir. 1975); Commercial Credit
Corp. v. Lloyd, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 15, 17-18 (D.C. Super., Small Claims 1973); Geohagan v.
Commercial Credit Corp., 204 S.E.2d 784, 786 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974). But see, e.g., United
States v. Pirnie, 472 F.2d 712, 713 (8th Cir. 1973); Hudspeth Motors, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 382
S.W.2d 191,192 (Ark. 1964); Texas Real Estate Comm'n v. Howard, 538 S.W.2d 429, 431-32
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally U.C.C. § 9-504(3)
(1972 version).
115. See Page v. Camper City & Mobile Home Sales, 297 So. 2d 810, 811 (Ala. 1974);
Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Alatzas, 287 A.2d 261, 264 (Md. 1972).
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notice, they adopted the position that what debtors could not
prove could not hurt them, and deleted the provisions for certified
mail notice from their security agreements. Thus, in order to protect a few deadbeats who refused notice, the courts lessened the
protections against perjury and mistake afforded the honest debtors under the security agreements then current. This is the typical
result from failure to recognize that creditor actions which help
debtors in general should not be seized upon as grounds for visiting a penalty on a creditor in a particular case. Secured parties are
notorious for their superior ability to gain access to lawyers compared to debtors; courts should assume that enough lawyers are
competent that sooner or later some are going to see to it that provisions in a security agreement which penalize their clients are going to be deleted. When they do, even incompetent lawyers are capable of following that lead, if for no other ground, than on the
time-honored principle of legal drafting, "Monkey see, monkey
116
do."
Rule 13: Justice Values the FundamentalInterests of One Party
More Highly than the Incidental Interests of Another Party.
I first found an example of this principle of justice in White and
Summers Uniform Commercial Code,11 7 wherein they discuss the
"main course" doctrine of Uniform Commercial Code security interests. 1"e This is a substantive principle of justice in this sense:
our society accepts it because we do not believe one class in society
is inherently superior to any other. Other societies, such as medieval Japan (samurai) or Communist societies (proletariat) may believe in the superiority of one class, whose weaker interests might
81
be found more important than another's fundamental interests."
116. Cf. Kaufman, Whodunit: Farm Products Collateral Under the Code, 16 WASHin the grand old boilerplate style").
117. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-17 (2d ed. 1980).
118. See id. § 25-17. See also CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 901, 1391A(A) (C. Kaufman
Supp. 1980). This is their explanation why U.C.C. § 9-308 (1972 version) subordinates
claims of secured parties claiming chattel paper "merely as proceeds of inventory subject to
BURN L.J. 250, 258 n.24 (1977) ("copying ...

a security interest" to the claims of buyers of that paper: "Presumably, the later party is
favored on the assumption that chattel paper is his main course but merely the frosting, on

the cake for'the mere proceeds claimant." J.
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

WHITE

& R.

SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW

§ 25-17 (2d ed. 1980).
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Rule 14: Courts Should Assume that Legislatures Expect Them
To Do Justice Until Legislatures Demonstrate Otherwise.
This rule applies chiefly in "partial codification" cases, or other
situations where legislatures overrule stupid court decisions and
courts are obliged to consider whether the legislative overruling
should be taken as destroying any possibility of further judicial
evolution in the area. This principle of justice was first suggested
by "The Case of the Spoiled Heir," in The Legal Process materials
of Dean Albert Sacks and the late Professor Henry Hart of
Harvard.11 9 The basic problem analyzed in the case is what to do
about someone who commits murder in order to inherit. Some
courts, ignoring a statute or two on their books expressing a clear
legislative policy against the commission of murder in their states,
stupidly thought that nothing could be done to prevent the murderer from inheriting. Whenever this happened, the legislature always eventually got around to correcting this stupidity by passing
a special statute on inheritance by murderers. Then the problem
presented itself whether a murderer under facts or circumstances
that did not exactly fit the statute could still inherit-courts unaware of this principle of justice would hold the murderer could. 1 0
Whenever I have referred to the "Myth of the All-Seeing and Inde1 2 I have in mind this principle of justice.12 2
fatigable Legislature,""

118.1 See the discussion of J. CLAVELL, SHOGUN (1976), in Kaufman, The Nature of
Justice: John Rawls and Pure ProceduralJustice, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 197, 216 n.65 (1980),
where I claim that this principle can also be derived as just procedure and, therefore, ought
to be followed regardless of the contrary substantive conceptions of other particular
societies.
119. H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 75-110 (Harv. Law School Mimeograph
1958).
120. See Oleff v. Hodapp, 195 N.E. 838, 841 (Ohio 1935) (first case allowed murderer to
take under statute of descent and distribution; statute forbade murderers to take from their
victims by descent and distribution; so next murderer claimed right to take by survival on a
joint tenancy savings account providing for right of survivorship; majority held that since
legislature had not foreseen all the possible ways the courts could be stupid enough to allow
murderers incentives to go out and kill people, nothing could be done but allow the murderer to profit by his wrong here, the public policy of Ohio being only to forbid murderers
taking by descent and distribution, and not against murder itself, or the existence of
financial incentives for its commission).
121. Cf. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 724(A)(1) (C. Kaufman Supp. 1980) (legislators not
"clones of Sir Galahad"). See generally H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process (Harv. Law
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A possible explanation for the failure of courts to achieve a result that the legislature would have wanted is the pre-Holmesian
belief of many courts that courts could not "make law," only legislatures could do that. This idea was a leftover from the "brooding
omnipresence" theory of jurisprudence, by which judges claimed
only to "discover" rules which were inherent, not to make law
themselves. 12 3 Hart and Sacks demonstrate the inherent intellectual fallacy of this view. Since judges must decide every case that
comes before them, they cannot avoid making "law" by deciding
any particular case one way instead of another. 12 4 They can only
choose which kind of law they are going to make, obsolete and unjust law by which murderers can kill others and legally get their
money, or modern and just law by which no killer who is thinking
about the money he will be getting
can ever take because of the
1 25
killed.
he
person
death of the
A much wiser result was reached by the court in Bank of Marin
v. England.'26 Here the technicalities of the bankruptcy law
seemed to require that a bank be liable to a trustee in bankruptcy
School mimeograph 1958). Dean Sacks tells the story of discussing Whiteley v. Chappell,
with a noted English legal scholar. See Whiteley v. Chappell, 4 Q.B. 147, 148-49 (1868) (no
crime to fraudulently impersonate one recently deceased since crime was to impersonate "a
person entitled to vote" and dead man no longer a "person"). Responding to the observation
that the opinion looked only to the letter of the statute without considering whether it
should be construed to advance underlying legislative purpose, said the Englishman: "Of
course! That is exactly how we want our judges to act." The numerous judicial exceptions
and avoidances of the Statute of Frauds show that the English did not always subscribe to
this view. The change in the English philosophy is caused by-or helped create-the fact
that its society is now so bureaucratic. The English have come to accept the idea that regular intervention of Parliament is a wise thing. In America the treatment of the judicial
branch as co-equal with the legislative branch has supported continuing the old tradition
that legislatures leave the process ofjudging alone as much as possible, Americans also tend
to believe that governmental action (particularly legislative and administrative action) is
inherently evil, if at times, necessary.
122. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 551(B)(1), 901(B), 1039A(C) (C. Kaufman Supp.
1980).

123. See J.

FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND

55 (1930) ("brooding omnipresence"

described as "Holmes' derisive phrase").
124. H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 515-40 (Harv. Law School Mimeograph
1958).
125. Note that the Ohio court violated the first principle of justice by allowing the
killer to profit by his own wrong in Oleff. See Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully
Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REv. 715, 715 (1936) (Nullus commodurn capere potest de injuria sua propria or "No one can obtain an advantage by his
own wrong").
126. 385 U.S. 99 (1966).
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for all checks honored between the time a voluntary petition was
filed and the time it was notified of its customer's bankruptcy. 2 "
Mr. Justice Douglas refused to hold this on the ground that a
bankruptcy court is a court of equity, and it would be inequitable
to hold the bank liable for losses that it had no ability to prevent. 28 Mr. Justice Douglas' superior wisdom in reading the legislative intent to achieve only fair results is demonstrated by the
subsequent codification of the Bank of Marin decision in the 1978
revision of the bankruptcy law. 2 '
This principle can also be derived from the constitutional theory
of separation of powers among co-equal branches of government. 12 9 1 If the legislature is a co-equal branch, then the judiciary
has the duty to treat it with respect, the same respect it gives to
other courts. 29 ' 2 Even if judges were privately convinced that the
legislature was filled with drunks, incompetents and thieves, nevertheless, their duty of legislative respect requires them as courts to
treat legislatures as being interested in justice until the legislature
proves the contrary.
In this principle of justice, I argue that courts ought generally to
take the attitude that they are courts of equity, 30 and legislatures
generally pass statutes with this understanding in mind, expecting
that courts will try to carry out their just and fair intent even if
the language of the statute might occasionally be inadequately narrow or overconfidently overbroad. A great many cases of this attitude by courts can in fact be found.'

127. See id. at 101.
128. See id. at 102-03. Note that this reasoning appears to be the fifth rule, previously
discussed.
129. See Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2595, 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 542 (West Supp. 1979); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 369 (1977).
129.1. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49, 68-70 (1803) (constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it).
129.2. See, e.g., Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1935);
Somportex Limited v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440-41 (3d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Allis v. Allis, 378 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1967).
130. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 961(A)(1) (C. Kaufman Supp. 1980).
131. See McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 493-94 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Lehigh Valley v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir.
1975). See generally Hammett, Any Promissory Note: The Obscene Security A Search for
the Non-Commercial Investment, 7 TEx. TEcn. L. REV. 25 (1975); Comment, Bank Loan
Participationsas Securities: Notes, Investments Contracts, and The Commercial Investment/Dichotomy, 15 DUQUESNE L. REv. 261 (1977).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol12/iss1/3

32

Kaufman: The Scientific Method in Legal Thought: Legal Realism and the Fou

1980]

PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
IV.

CONCLUSION

Since we have seen it demonstrated how we can distill principles
of justice from rules of law, this question legitimately arises: what
is the proper use of principles of justice in a society that believes in
the rule of law? Occasionally some of my students have assumed
that principles of justice will replace the rule of law as the chief
mechanism by which cases are decided. But I do not believe this
will happen.
A traditional justification for the rule of law is the need for standards against which the conduct of individual judges can be measured. As Mr. Justice Cardozo said, "A jurisprudence that is not
constantly brought into relation to objective or external standards
incurs the risk of degenerating into what the Germans call 'Die
Gefiihlsjurisprudenz,' a jurisprudence of mere sentiment or feeling."1' While principles of justice also constitute an external standard, they would bind a judge to a much smaller extent than do
rules of law, because there would be no check on the judicial decision in those cases where principles of justice conflict. It is not to
be supposed that these conflicts are rare; probably they appear in
most litigated cases. Few competent lawyers would refuse to settle
a case when their client had not a shred of justice on his side.
Rules of law are more predictable in the case of conflict; they codify not only a principle of justice, but often a judgment as to the
proper balance of the weight of justice in situations when principles conflict.
For example, in one of the first cases I tried,133 the conflict was
between Pathfinder, a consignor of merchandise, a secured party (a
bank and the SBA, which had guaranteed the bank's loan), and
myself, the trustee in bankruptcy (who represented unsecured
creditors). 34 The balance of justice in the case was obscure. Pathfinder had not filed a financing statement, as all consignors now
know to be the only safe method of proceeding;1 3 5 the bank had,
but was aware that it was not supposed to be getting Pathfinder's
property as collateral. Pathfinder's argument basically was that no132. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 106 (1921). For a more detailed
discussion of this point, see note 45 supra.
133. In re Webb, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 394 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
134. See id. at 395.
135. See U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(c).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

33

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 12 [2022], No. 1, Art. 3

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:77

body was hurt, so that under Rule 2, what it did was okay, and
under Rule 6, taking its property was unfair. The bank's argument
was basically the corollary to Rule 5, that it had undertaken the
loan that made it possible for Webb to go into the oil field equipment business; since it was a chief contributor to the creation of
Webb's assets, it was fair to allow the bank any assets that could
meet the description in its security agreement. My argument as
trustee amounted to the contention that Pathfinder should lose
under Rule 5, since it had the power to prevent the loss by filing a
financing statement, and the bank should lose under Rule 1, since
it would defeat everyone else's reasonable expectations for the
bank to get property as collateral which it allowed others to believe
it was not claiming, and under Rule 6, since the bank was trying to
get a windfall at the expense of unsecured creditors. A court which
had only justice, and no rules, to bind it could be excused for flipping a coin, or what is more likely, for making a decision based on
other factors, such as which party or which lawyer it liked best, or
some other basis not accepted as proper in our society. Fortunately
for my case, the rules of law seemed to embody a resolution of the
conflicts in favor of the position I advanced. The court did not
have to apply the justice directly to the facts; it understood that
the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code had to have contemplated that the interests of consignors, secured parties, and unsecured creditors might conflict. To the extent the court believed
the drafters of the Code had actually weighed the competing interests, it had guidance as to the preferable (most just) result.
This kind of problem raises the eternal, and possibly insoluble,
problem of the proper balance between the mass and the individual, the need for rules and the need for individualized treatment,
the concept of law and the concept of equity. Or to put it another
way, this raises the question how much discretion we want judges
to have. I must confess that I am greatly taken with Llewellyn's
view it is a good thing for judges to believe strongly in the obligation to follow precedent, because precedent binds weaker judges
much less than great judges."3 e That is the ideal situation. Though
we trust no judges sufficiently to exempt them from the obligation
to follow the rules of law embodied in precedent," 7 we understand
136. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 68 (2d ed. 1951).
137. This probably explains why, though Llewellyn felt closer to "natural law" theory
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that for the law to survive it must evolve, it must adapt to the
changes which occur in the society it serves. It is better that great
judges make those adaptations than the weak. This article is not
intended to change this system. It is intended to make more great
judges, thereby making the same old system work better.
These principles of justice have such an attraction to me because
they are necessary for clear thinking, not because they are just.
They are tools of thought that can be used in any intellectual endeavor. They can be used to think about economics, about morals,
about nuclear physics. They are rules about the proper relationship between means and ends. If in law, they happen to be rules
about justice, that is because (I have argued) justice is the end to
which rules of law are the means.
Most of these "principles of justice" are just basic postulates of
any theory of categorization. Rule 3 amounts to the assertion that
the means should serve your ends. Rule 11 amounts to the assertion that you should not discourage what you want to encourage.
Rule 12 is the same. Rule 13 amounts to the statement that what is
important is more important than what is unimportant. At this
level of simplicity, these rules become mere truisms, definitional
statements of how we think, or a computer or anything else would
have to think. I do not reduce the fourteen principles to this level
of simplicity because they lose their usefulness in judging, their
relevance to the rules of law used in deciding actual cases. But it is
perhaps worth bearing in mind that these principles can be reduced to so basic a level; they are sufficiently fundamental that no
judge who cannot think about competing rules of law in this way
can aspire to go down in history for his greatness in judging. This
is not to deny that judges can do a perfectly adequate job "feeling"
what is just, we do believe that "intuition outruns articulation. 138
But it seems likely that he will do a better job if he also underthan any other competing explanation of how law is made, he could never reduce legal realism to natural law. He would never have been willing to license judges in general to reason
from abstract principles to particular results, ignoring particular doctrines and precedents
as "contrary to natural law." He would have agreed with me, I think, in saying that judges
in general, as a mass, are to be trusted; their natural leaders (great judges) are to be trusted
even more than most; but not all judges individually are to be trusted. The only protection
against the untrustworthy individual is to require a certain amount of herd instinct, to deny
judges the license to ignore what other judges are doing.
138. See Kaufman, The Nature of Justice: John Rawls and Pure Procedural Justice,
19 WASHBURN L.J. 197, 204 n.33 (1980).
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stands why any particular result is just. Certainly it is to be expected that lawyers will do a better job if they can reach that sense
of justice of the judge, if they can understand why the judge rejected their line of cases and accepted the precedents of their opponent, if they can understand why it is necessary to make a judge
feel, in a doubtful case, the justice of their position as well as the
law of it, and if they can understand what principles of justice always exist to be appealed to when the judge is in doubt.
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